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DAVID D. HADDOCK*

When Are Environmental Amenities
Policy-Relevant?
ABSTRACT
Due to the high transactioncost that would be necessaryfor large
numbers of people to negotiate with each other, even those who
are usually sanguine about private markets become reserved
when externalitiesaffect large populations.Among economists, at
least, the distinction between private and societal interest is well
understoodfor pecuniary externalities. But neglect of Buchanan
and Stubblebine's article "Externality" is as widespread among
economists as among legal scholars, biologists, environmental
scientists, or politicians and has left the same distinction widely
unrecognized for non-pecuniary externalities. If only a few
parties on either side of an interaction experience a relevant
externality- given Buchanan and Stubblebine's careful
distinction between relevant and irrelevant externalities- private
interactions can appropriately internalize costs and benefits
across the entire population. Regardless of the perceptiveness of
legal and cultural institutions in placing entitlements, and
regardless of the level of transaction cost across the entire
universe of the affected, a surprising number of externalities will
readilyfix themselves. The desirability of corrective intervention
is much too easily conceded, at great cost to society.
Suppose that goods could be categorized into two mutually
exclusive cells: market goods such as shoes or movies that afford minimal
value beyond the direct consumers and environmental goods such as
forests and meadows that in addition to marketed outputs provide
* Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, and Senior
Associate, PERC, dhaddock@northwestem.edu. The ideas presented here germinated at
PERC's annual Political Economy Forum, Private Land Conservation: Institutions and
Instruments, Big Sky, Mont., Dec. 5-8, 2002, sparked by the participants' enthusiastic and
expert discussions during (and between) sessions. Unfortunately, successive insights
followed one upon the other so swiftly that properly attributing many seminal ideas
proved impossible. As the author arrived fairly ignorant of the entire field, anyone in
attendance who originated any idea elaborated below may claim due credit with no fear of
contradiction. "But for" causation, however, is clear in the instances of the conference
papers by Terry L. Anderson and by Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, as well as the
commentary on the Dnes & Lueck paper by Walter N. Thurman. Subsequent comments
from Steven Eagle, Ronald Johnson, Lynne Kiesling, Fred McChesney, Roger Meiners, and
economics seminar participants at Loyola University Chicago have helped immeasurably
to hone the argument.
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substantial spillover amenities to other members of the community. In
the real world there is a continuous gradation, of course, but, as will be
discussed below,' coherent analysis nearly always assumes away most
real world complications in order to deal clearly with a subset, then
gradually introduces additional complications one or a few at a time.
2
Indeed, that is the "scientific method."
There is a tradeoff between goods of one sort and goods of
another. Manufactured goods compete for resources with alternative
manufactured goods-machines useful for making movies cannot
contribute much to the manufacture of shoes. Manufactured goods
compete for resources with environmental goods-people who are
making shoes do not have time to tend a forest. But environmental goods
also compete with alternative environmental goods - an acre of forest
cannot simultaneously be an acre of meadow. There are many facets to
that competition, among them the extent to which free riding-the
ability of some people to enjoy environmental attributes for which they
do not pay -frustrates achievement of sufficient amenities.
One feature that seems to set many environmental amenities
apart from most manufactured goods is an apparent difficulty of
excluding those non-payers. If an individual perceives no change in
environmental amenities whether that individual contributes to the
provision or not, many people will choose to contribute nothing. Thus,
some argue there is a threat that environmental amenities will be poorly
funded unless there is government intervention.
That such free riding might lead to excessive tradeoffs of
environmental amenities for manufactured goods is easily recognized by
nearly anyone who carefully ponders the environment. But recognizing
the easy problem leaves a lot of hard ones unresolved and leaves one far
short of appropriate public policy. Two of the many difficult problems
will be examined here. First, when does the expression "might lead to
excessive tradeoffs of environmental amenities for manufactured goods"
properly translate into "will lead to excessive tradeoffs of environmental
amenities for manufactured goods?" Second, assuming might properly
translates into will, under what circumstances can even a presumptively
well intentioned government be expected to resolve the situation
properly?
It is helpful to introduce the might-versus-will issue through a
concrete example, a classic hypothetical from economics concerning the

1. See infra Part IM.
2. JAMES TREFIL, READING THE MIND OF GOD: IN SEARCH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNIVERSALrrY §§ 3, 11 (1989).
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external benefit that clover provides bees. 3 Land that is growing clover
could instead be growing wheat. Simply avoid needless arithmetic that
would leave the result unaltered and assume that the out-of-pocket cost
to a farmer for cultivating clover is the same as the out-of-pocket cost for
cultivating wheat. Though neighboring beekeepers' bees collect nectar
from the blossoms, the more obvious reason for a farmer to cultivate
clover is to produce hay for animals. The wind cross-pollinates wheat
and other grasses, which produce no nectar useful to honeybees. The
Nobel Prize winning economist James Meade concluded that, if there
were no external encouragement to the farmer, the amount of clover
planted would be deficient. 4 Meade argued that left to his own devices a
farmer would expand his clover field only until the value of the
additional hay that could be produced from still another acre was less
than the cost of producing it, including the opportunity cost of the
foregone wheat. Suppose that a farmer has 49 acres in clover and is
considering whether to add a fiftieth, and at that margin the hay would
be worth $99. Suppose that $100 worth of wheat could be produced on
that acre. The acre would then be planted in wheat.
But a neighboring beekeeper also makes decisions at the margin.
Suppose that adding another hive would cost her $50. The value of the
resulting honey depends on how much clover is nearby from which the
bees can easily collect nectar. With 49 acres of clover in the farmer's field,
the extra hive would increase the beekeeper's honey production by $49,
so the hive will not be added. If, however, the fiftieth acre were planted
in clover, honey production would increase by $60, ten dollars more than
the hive's cost to the beekeeper. Add to the $99 value of the hay from the
marginal acre the $10 of net increased honey value and it becomes
apparent that, overall, clover is the better use of the acre at $109 versus
the $100 value of the acre in wheat. From this example, Meade concluded
that there would be too little clover planted unless the government acted
to enhance its acreage. Stated differently, there would be insufficient
clover due to an uncompensated positive externality provided by the
farmer to the beekeeper -the "amenity" nectar would be underproduced
due to the beekeeper's free riding.

3. There is a converse positive externality that bees provide clover by crosspollinating the plant. But as there is no reason, in general, to expect a constant ratio of
magnitudes of the two externalities, that detail is inessential for present purposes and will
be ignored. If and when the bees provide the more important externality, the parties in the
hypothetical merely reverse roles.
4. James E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62
ECON. J. 54, 56 (1952).
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Though it is not of central concern here, nearly a decade after
Meade wrote, Coase noted that the marginal acre would indeed be
converted to clover if it were easy for the beekeeper to identify and
negotiate with the farmer. 5 Because a bee colony produces more honey if
more clover is growing near its hive, the beekeeper would be willing to
pay for that advantage if necessary. Suppose the beekeeper offers $5
conditional on the farmer planting an additional acre in clover. The
farmer now discerns revenues of $104 if the marginal acre is planted in
clover ($99 worth of hay plus a fee of $5 from the beekeeper) versus $100
from planting the acre in wheat. The beekeeper gains $10 from the extra
honey from which she pays the farmer $5, leaving her a profit of $5.
Meade's problem disappears. In the language of economics, the external
benefit to the beekeeper that the farmer had been ignoring has been
internalized into his decision-making process. As seen by the farmer, the
opportunity cost of the acre in wheat would now be the foregone $99
value of the hay plus the foregone $5 fee from the beekeeper, which
exceeds the $100 value of the acre in wheat.
Meade-like problems are widely understood among environmentalists, while the more sophisticated of them also understand
Coase's point that government solutions are unneeded if transaction cost
is low so that an internalization is workable. This article focuses instead
on a different, common, but poorly recognized situation, one in which
the magnitude of transaction cost is completely irrelevant. Even if
transaction cost is prohibitive, the externality, though real enough in
aggregate, may dissolve before decisions regarding the margin - that
fiftieth acre -are reached. Suppose that in the example above the value
of an additional hive of bees fell below its cost as soon as the farmer had
planted ten acres of clover. The farmer, however, would keep expanding
the clover field to 49 acres solely for the value of the hay. The farmer
may not even notice that the beekeeper is producing honey nearby; the
beekeeper may have no idea where the bees are gathering nectar, merely
that they are collecting it as fast as their little wings will carry them.
Despite the externality, and despite the paucity of information and the
prohibitive transaction cost thereby implied, there is nothing
objectionable about the acreage planted in clover though the farmer

5. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Cheung
subsequently discovered that, long before Meade wrote, many clover farmers and
beekeepers had been contractually internalizing that very externality. See Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. LAW & ECON. 11, 12 (1973).
Other useful commentaries on Meade's argument appear in J.R. Gould, Meade on External
Economies: Should the Beneficiaries Be Taxed?, 16 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1973), and David B.
Johnson, Meade, Bees, and Externalities, 16 J.L. & ECON. 35 (1973).
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ignores the beekeeper's interests altogether. In aggregate there is
definitely a positive externality since the beekeeper is benefiting from the
nectar produced by the clover field, but at the margin the externality is
irrelevant. The beekeeper would not pay the farmer to expand the clover
field since the marginal acre is worthless to her, though clearly the
average acre is not. Nor would the farmer likely threaten a gross
contraction of acreage (from 49 acres to something less than the beesatiating 10 acres) merely to coerce a small fee from the beekeeper.
Whether or not transaction cost is prohibitive, there would be no useful
role for a policy urging any alteration of the clover field. Here, then,
transaction cost is totally irrelevant.
The focus of this article - the distinction between relevant and
irrelevant externalities-originated in James Buchanan and William
Craig Stubblebine's "Externality." 6 Though "Externality" has attracted a
small cult following among economists, it is virtually unknown among
legal scholars, to whom it seems intuitive that chronic externalities beg
for public policy initiatives. The nearly lost point of "Externality" is that
more often even chronic externalities are irrelevant. If the farmer would
use his field in some different way if, counterfactually, he took full
account of the beekeeper's inconsistent preferences, the externality is
indeed a phenomenon worth considering. But, if the farmer's use pattern
would remain unchanged even if he took the beekeeper's preferences
into account, the externality is real but simply does not matter.
Externalities, positive and negative, are everywhere but are usually
economically meaningless. Though chronic, such externalities, like
others used in the discussion below, need no regulation.
I. WHY MIGHT THE ENVIRONMENT MERIT NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT?
A major problem addressed in the environmental literature is
that the existence of the very large population enjoying many amenities
is patently obvious, but there is a reasonable way neither to take a
plausible census nor to gauge the strength of individual demands for the
amenities. 7 Negotiating with such vast numbers would impose
overwhelming transaction cost, and even then individuals, being
trapped in a prisoners' dilemma, would have every incentive to
understate or even deny their interest. If everyone else accurately
6. James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371
(1962).
7. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L.
765, 777 (1999).
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reported and paid for the environmental amenity that they want, the
trivial contribution that an individual could afford to add to that heap
would cause barely a ripple. But if the others, thinking along a similar
line, conceal personal demands, a forlorn exception would finance
pathetically little. So everyone's best strategy seems to be concealing
individual interest and in that way saving money. Consequently, it
might appear that very little private funding for the amenity will
materialize.
From that platform the usual argument proceeds to what this
article will call The Two Claims. First Claim: Due to a high-transactioncost/free-rider market failure, private investments in environmental
amenities will certainly be deficient. Second Claim: It is thus necessary
that government proxy for the governed. While government cannot
know the unknowable, it can tax to fund some amenity investment and
in that way extract us from our imprisoning dilemma. With care being
taken that estimated amenity values are reasonable, that would be an
improvement over total reliance on voluntary finance.
The Two Claims may hold in special cases, but they fall far short
of a general rule. The problem becomes clearer when couched concretely:
Many people in Dakota value the forests of Oregon (and many
Oregonians value the badlands of Dakota) just as Dakotans value shoes
to wear (especially in winter). If necessary, nearly every Dakotan would
willingly pay to foster forests in Oregon, although most Dakotans would
pay substantially less for that than they are willing to pay for a pair of
shoes. But due to high transaction cost and their doomed hope of free
riding-doomed because it seems there surely will be little enough to
free ride on-the Dakotan interest in Oregon's forests registers in no
market. Their interest in shoes, in contrast, comes readily to shoemakers'
attention because that market has low transaction cost as well as
presenting little opportunity to free ride on other people's expenditures
on shoes.
So it seems that there will be enough shoes in Dakota but (since
Dakotan interests are being ignored) too few trees in Oregon-unless a
government intervenes. It seems that the intervention must be national
because there are interested parties in every state (indeed vastly more
outside than inside Oregon and Dakota) and many of them value
Oregon's forests - this article's author for instance (true fact), probably
its reader, but wait, even people in Quebec and Paraguay, the Finns, the
Maltese and the Kenyans, some Punjabi-you get the idea. Even our
national government cannot encompass enough taxpayers.
Naysayers may scoff that Oregon has incentive enough to
maintain forestland for the tourist spending of nonresidents, but that
argument offers scant solace to those who never visit Oregon but value
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knowing that great evergreen forests survive there. Whether or not
tourist demand registers fully, The Claims hold that there will be too
little forest in Oregon because that existence value never weighs in. The
Claims are interchangeable via easy word substitution, indeed are massproduced for assembly line application to every manifestly valuable
environmental feature, as well as seemingly endless more contentious
candidates that apparently matter to some people -Dakota's badlands of
course, the Everglades, the oil-befouled Spanish coast, penguins in
Antarctica, and humongous turtles in the Galapagos, Andean darkness
so coveted by astronomers, the chambered nautilus, Easter Island's stone
heads, trails to the very peaks of Everest and Fujiyama, Bengal tigers
menacing the honey hunters of the Sundarbans, or great white sharks
and salt-water crocodiles and funnel web spiders busying themselves
with Australians. Appealing amenities all (or nearly so), but how best to
arrange for them?
II. OR WHY NOT LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION - OR
NONE AT ALL?
People are not identical, and they are not immobile like plants or
sponges that live or die wherever their embryos chance to lodge.
Different people have different interests, and they move around a fair bit
in response to their personal interests. It is certainly not true that
everyone living in Oregon is there because that state has evergreens. But
it is certainly true that someone who deeply loves evergreen forest will
more likely live in Oregon than will someone who does not care for such
trees. Being around an evergreen forest provides non-pecuniary income
to anyone who enjoys it, but not to someone who barely notices. The
evergreens even reduce non-pecuniary income for anyone who finds
dark forests spooky. Thus, holding a job's pecuniary returns constant, a
forest lover will do better in Oregon than will others. More subtly, one
who desperately loves evergreen forest will do better in Oregon than
someone who only likes such forest quite a lot - it is not merely the
existence of a preference but its strength that counts. Similarly, a person
who deeply loves the Badlands is more likely to end up a Dakotan than
someone who finds them only quite appealing, much less someone who
abhors broken terrain.
Thus, one who loves Oregon's forests will be more likely to
accept a job there when and if it is offered. But someone who
desperately, passionately loves Oregon's forests will be quite likely to
accept that job or to become self-employed to relocate to the state if no
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offer is forthcoming. 8 Anyone helping college graduates find
employment knows full well that there is no perfect correlation between
their eventual haunts and the environmental entities that they especially
value, but there is definitely a positive correlation, a stronger one for
those with more intense preferences.
Therefore, those few who most intensely enjoy Oregon's forests
should live predominantly (not exclusively) in Oregon. Those who most
intensely love the badlands should be concentrated in Dakota. So some
(not all) Oregonians want more forest in their state than most Dakotans
want forest in Oregon. Some (not all) Dakotans more resolutely defend
the badlands than nearly anyone from Oregon.
With isolated and unimportant exceptions, evergreens are not
Christmas trees. Each household must have its own Christmas tree if its
children are to enjoy placing baubles all over it (then later enjoy
watching a grumbling parent tediously remove and store those
decorations). In contrast-and here is the beauty of it-tree-loving
Oregonians enjoy the amenity that their forests exude as a view, a sense
of solitude, the smell, the sights and sounds of the forest flora and fauna,
just knowing it is there, or all those at once. Those joys in no way
interfere with similar and simultaneous enjoyment by anyone and
everyone from Dakota, most of whom are not even in Oregon at the
moment and some of whom never will be. We can all enjoy the exact
same trees at the exact same moment, but nearly every Dakotan is
satiated before the most intense of the Oregonian demands are met.
Of course, several million people live in Oregon, so perhaps the
problem has merely been localized rather than eradicated. Even so, that
fact implies that much of the environmental regulation is misguidedSalem rather than the District of Columbia could better govern the hightransaction-cost/free-rider problem. 9 Though many Dakotans definitely

8. The contention does not fail if a great many people who love evergreen forests
have inappropriate skills for Oregon jobs, but only if forest love and Oregon-appropriate
skills are strongly but negatively correlated. The converse is more likely-to facilitate
recruitment any employer exploiting a skill that is especially prevalent among forest lovers
(or haters) will, where feasible, locate the work site inside (or outside) some place like
Oregon. Like people, jobs also move around a fair bit.
9. Or the problem might best be delegated to specialized agencies with borders not
coincident with any other political unit's, being either larger than a state-perhaps in
addition to Oregon include Washington and Northern California (and why not British
Columbia?) - or smaller -Oregon's Willamette Valley might encompass a complete unit.
More external effects would no doubt spill across the borders as the unit's area was
reduced, but its compactness would simultaneously provide information and agency cost
offsets while mitigating the monopoly distortion of geographically large unitary
governments. So the proper conception is cost versus benefit rather than costless benefit.
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enjoy Oregon forests, the demands of most, if not all of them, are
irrelevant in the Buchanan & Stubblebine sense. Legislators in Salem
represent most of the relatively few relevant demands; the U.S. Congress
represents predominately the many irrelevant ones.
Point taken, but the argument has been halted in midstream.
Though the localized-not-eradicated viewpoint may sometimes be
sound, in other instances even it fails. Far out in one tail of the bellshaped Gaussian statistical 10distribution (a distribution often called
"normal" for good reason), a few Oregonians will have atypically
intense demands for evergreen forests even when compared with the
vast majority of their fellows, who located in Oregon more for the skiing,
the sailing, the fishing, the microbreweries, and coffee, or even by
random chance. Perhaps most of the others also really enjoy Oregon's
forests, just not as much as those who are way out in the tail. If after
taking into account both benefit and cost those in the tail achieve forests
that are appropriately extensive for their purposes, other Oregoniansand everyone else - will be satiated.
Indeed, though Oregonians' demonstrable love of evergreen
forest offered good expositional footing, a few individuals far out in the
tail might even live in Dakota, or Korea for that matter. If a non-political
solution is workable, the more important consideration will not be where
people with marginally relevant demands for the amenity live but how
many of them there are. When they are few, there is no obvious hightransaction-cost/free-rider problem, thus no relevant externality even
though millions of people enjoy the amenity, and consequently no
inexorable requirement to override privately determined allocations.
The article now lays out those ideas more methodically,
beginning with a brief discussion of the scientific method to account for
the argument's initial unrealistic though simple form in which (not
incidentally) there are no environmental amenities at all. Additional
complications are gradually introduced to make the points outlined
above. It is argued that private parties will often (not necessary always)
better optimize environmental amenities than a diligent, honest
bureaucrat could be imagined doing. The bureaucrat's crippling
disadvantage is that most amenity values are not merely subjective and
thus knowable only to the demander, but the link between production
and consumption skirts formal markets where objective proxies might

See David D. Haddock, Must Hydrological Regulation Be Centralized?, in WATER
MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION 43,44 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hills eds., 1997).
10. The argument would apply equally well with almost any standard statistical
distribution, though some variant of the Gaussian seems appropriate in this instance.
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possibly be observed." And though the argument would be
strengthened, the article only occasionally brushes the voluminous
public choice literature questioning the extent to which a bureaucrat
would endeavor optimally to execute what appears to the public to be
the bureaucracy's charge. The article concludes by pondering reforms
that would transfer bureaucratic decision making into private hands by
using tax allowances or other subsidies. Care should be taken to
ascertain that it would not be better to eliminate the bureaucracy but
eschew the subsidy. The scientific method enables one to annoy nearly
every special interest.
III. KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Scientific Progress
Earth is hardly Sesame Street but instead a planet chock full of
complex hazards, a disagreeable feature that successful organisms
survive in various ways. Many insects, fish, rodents, and plants produce
swarms of offspring so that a lucky few can reproduce the entire next
generation. Human families of even 15 or 18 are minuscule in
comparison-we humans survive more on logical ability than profligate
reproduction. Even so, we are not nearly as smart as we pretend to be,
and urgent problems sometimes overtax an unsystematic mind. In the
mists of prehistory, our ancestors began to trace out a way to mitigate
the impact. Gradual elaboration led to a marked increase in life
expectancy-in today's First World by an order of magnitude or more.
Only during recent millennia, however, has that tool been consciously
recognized and systematized as the scientific method.12
Science relies on simplifying assumptions, beginning an attack
on some potentially overwhelming problem by imagining a setting in
which most of its complications are nonexistent. The scientist then tries
to create a logical, internally consistent story regarding an imaginary
world that may only vaguely resemble the real one, though one hopes
with a few important similarities. To a scientist that story is called a
theory, a very different meaning than mere speculation or assertion, for
which the word is substituted all too often in non-scientific writing. A
scientific theory is potentially useful if it foresees events that people had
been unable to predict without it. Indeed, a theory may suddenly

11. On the economic implications of subjective value, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945).
12. This section leans heavily on TREFIL, supra note 2.
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problems that its originator had
become almost alive and begin attacking
13
addressing.
not even anticipated
Even non-scientists repeatedly, if unconsciously, employ the
scientific method when planning a trip to work, contemplating but the
tiniest fraction of what might plausibly be encountered en route, the rest
being implicitly assumed too improbable or unimportant to merit more
than passing attention, if that. Scientific theories are to the world as a
model plane is to an airliner- several parts may behave analogously, but
the model omits a great many features, which defeats an exact (perhaps
even a close) correspondence with the real thing.
Thus, scientific counterfactuals predict impending events
imprecisely. But if the model is not too difficult (costly) to employ, even
rough predictions can be quite useful. Today's assumption (albeit
implicit) that no fire engines block any road of interest suggests a route
to the office that at best approximates the ideal and occasionally misfires
badly. But even when misfiring, past experience may have shown the
model useful often enough to justify employing it again tomorrow.
If a model proves efficient in that way, more detailed versions
might be built that gradually relax simplifying assumptions (address
more real world complexity)- even model planes can become more like
airliners. Because the researcher better understands interactions among
features modeled earlier, the more elaborate model is more tractable
than had the initial version included all those complications at once.
With luck, the gradually refined predictions converge on subsequent
experience. If not, the new variant will be discarded.
To illustrate, consider how that primitive excuse for a vehicle, a
tricycle, enables children to learn to peddle and steer along sidewalks
while deferring mastery of a great many more difficult skills. After those
simple techniques become second nature, the child advances to a more
complex model called a bicycle with nearly single-minded focus on the
intricacies of balance. But one should thoroughly master the bicycle
before challenging formidable highway hazards on a motorcycle. Injury
and mortality statistics indicate that a perfect model is never actually
attained, but the systematic progression greatly improves a rider's odds.
Without the scientific method, we could all be mired in a crippling,
nihilistic attention deficit disorder, our overmatched minds flitting
fecklessly among complications, with no convergence emerging.

13. That can be annoying if the theory, anxious to reveal some additional insight,
persistently awakens its originator during the night. Artistic works also occasionally master
their originators. See LUIGI PIRANDELLO, SIX CHARACTERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUTHOR

(Stephen Muirine trans., 2003) (1921).
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Weather forecasting offers a familiar instance of evolving
understanding of vastly complex systems through iterative model
complication. Extreme stakes (life or death on occasion) repay rapt
attention to predictions that remain observably deficient in an absolute
sense. Though tornadoes rarely strike any given spot in a warning zone,
alerts incite anxious preparations to seek shelter if that should prove
advisable. Still, the weather model relied upon last year regularly is
discarded as too imprecise in comparison with this year's new and
improved (though still pitiful) version, just as the new one will be
discarded in its turn for an even better, though possibly more complex
variant. In more technical nomenclature, the new model has refuted the
old one though it is not "the truth" but a still flawed tool that merely
makes predictions that are closer to subsequent observations. 14 Scientific
counterfactuals resemble hailstones -layer built upon layer; insignificant
contrivances to a skeptic that occasionally attain a heft that, though only
an approximation rather than reality, simply can no longer be ignored.
Even critical legal theorists select a route to work by building
models.
IV. A DISCOURSE ON ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES
Taking land and sea together, human action can hardly alter our
planet's area. Many different activities occupy that surface, some quite
compatible -passersby enjoy the mountain vista across a bucolic pasture
while oil is pumped from beneath - but others less so - the pasture's

livestock preclude a shopping center on that site. While compatible uses
may overlap, increased area in one use often imposes a corresponding
decrease on some incompatible ones. Evaluating such displacement
compels at least an implicit cost-benefit analysis. This article consciously
begins with a very simple though unrealistic counterfactual, then in
14. Model evolution need not converge on an epistemologically flawless worldview to
yield predictions a lot better than guesswork. Ptolemy's crystal spheres provide an
excellent example, though that astronomical theory was ultimately laughed to scorn. Those
same spheres also illustrate that models can be forced into extreme contortions during
efforts to preserve the received understanding while nonetheless accounting for perplexing
new observations. Growing complexity may herald a paradigm shift- a totally new model
that makes predictions as good or better than the old one while being simpler and easier to
understand. Thus, Copernican astronomy supplanted its Ptolemaic predecessor (to be
compromised in turn by the Theory of Relativity). THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs (1962). But thank goodness we had Ptolemy and then Copernicus
while awaiting Einstein, who of course stood on Copernican and thus Ptolemaic shoulders.
That the Theory of Relativity ultimately is sure to be fundamentally modified or even
discarded does not and ought not dissuade us from using it until a better model appears
(the present challengers include string theory and the theory of dark energy).
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subsequent sections converges on more realistic analyses of those
environmental amenities that are compatible with some commercial land
uses though incompatible with others.
A. A Drab If Lucrative Island Life
An Amenity-Free Baseline

As odd as it may seem, meaningful comparisons become more
obvious if one begins with a hypothetical that has no environmental
amenities at all and then observes if and how adding them to the model
affects the results. So imagine that a rancher single-handedly owns and
operates an entire island, a family legacy for generations that she would
never consider selling. No one else ever visits or cares about her island,
which is uniformly fertile, the whole of it attractive for commercial
exploitation. Market prices and transport fees are unchanging and leave
but two plausible outputs, timber or beef, either to be sold offshore, and
in that market the island is producing too little to affect either price. In
this section, the rancher regards the island's pasture and forest as mere
tools for maximizing pecuniary return. Government policy is neutral no tax or subsidy affects the island's use pattern. For now it will be
assumed that the rancher costlessly acquires information, including
foresight.
Under those simplifying assumptions, the entire island might
plausibly be used for either timber or cattle, whichever yielded the
greatest revenue per unit area after transport costs are deducted. But it is
net rather than gross revenue that determines land use, and factor
requirements for the alternatives have very different time profiles. To
concentrate entirely on cattle, the rancher and her capital would be
working long hours during the late winter calving season, then again
during the summer's haying, and finally when surplus animals were
shipped in early fall. Given the island's climate, cattle require little
attention during the rest of the year, the rancher wallowing in idleness.
But saplings of the appropriate sort can only be planted during spring,
while mature trees are cut while the sap is down during late fall and
winter. Cattle are at their most demanding when the forest needs little
attention and vice versa, which counters whatever economies of
specialization may exist, so mixed agriculture is a possibility, and
henceforth will be assumed.
Little cost is imposed if only a few days are devoted to one or the
other of the outputs, because the requisite labor and capital will be
withdrawn when they are of relatively little value to the other process.
But increasing the days devoted to the former requires diverting time of
increasing urgency for the latter, implying for each output an increasing
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opportunity cost. Due to the increasing opportunity cost of concentrating
the rancher's labor and capital, the net value of marginal land units will
be a decreasing function of the area devoted to either product, even
though market prices are invariant to island output. 15 The marginal net
value of timber would initially be high because the marginal opportunity
costs of the other inputs are low for the first land devoted to forest most of the work required to maintain the forest occurs when cattle
barely compete for attention. But as tree planting operations keep
expanding, time and then more time is diverted from increasingly
weighty cattle-tending duties so the marginal net value of timber would
fall due to the increased opportunity costs that must be netted against
timber receipts. Similarly, the marginal net value of cattle would be high
if virtually the entire island were devoted to forest because the
opportunity cost of the inputs required to exploit the first pastureland
would be low -cattle draw most inputs during the late winter, summer,
and early fall when forest requirements are few. But if the pasture kept
expanding, the marginal net value of cattle would fall as the requisite
work began to intrude on prime timber-producing months.
Thus, maximizing the island's value might easily prevent the
ranch from specializing in either timber or cattle, but instead require
production of a mix of the two outputs. Assume that the island long ago
settled into a stable, comprehensively renewable, value-maximizing
division between forest and pasture. One percent of the timber is
harvested and replanted each year. Hence, the age distribution of the
woodland is unchanging, but mature trees are found in various locations
around the island through a century-long cycle.
B. Even Cowgirls Get the Blues
A Private EnvironmentalAmenity
As detailed in section III above, the scientific method begins with
a rudimentary model that is relatively easy to understand, then
iteratively relaxes one or a few of its simplifying assumptions to observe
what difference (if any) that concession to realism makes. 16 In that spirit,
15. Given the rancher's present exclusive focus on pecuniary magnitudes, the marginal
value of a land unit used to produce timber (or cattle) would be the increase in total timber
(cattle) output as a result of a marginal increase in land used to produce it, multiplied by
the market price of timber (cattle) net of the per unit transport charge necessary to ship it to
market, a product from which the marginal opportunity cost of the other inputs necessary
to exploit that marginal land unit has been subtracted.
16. Were this an empirical paper incorporating an appropriate data set, successive
versions of the model could be pitted against each other via "critical tests." If within
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imagine that our lonely rancher feels consoled when sitting under her
forest's trees. Apart from an enjoyable anticipation of receipts from cattle
sales, she experiences neither pleasure nor pain when contemplating
pasture. Thus, the forest now provides an additional though ephemeral
benefit to the rancher - an environmental amenity - that is distinct from
the timber revenues she receives.
Monies from timber sales are objectively measurable and
directly comparable to income from selling cattle. Maximizing the
aggregated income maximizes the value of what the rancher can
purchase while ashore. Neither timber nor cattle nor the income earned
when they are sold provides the rancher with satisfaction, but enjoying
goods that can then be purchased does. Trees, animals, and money are
mere accounting units encountered along the passage to the rancher's
utility, the magnitude of ultimate interest to economics.
In contrast, the amenity is not marketed but consumed directly
by the rancher, valuable to her because it makes her happy, providing
utility directly. There is no market measure by which the reader could
contrast the rancher's benefit from a marginally increased amenity with
any resulting decrease in pecuniary income. Discovering all the relevant
objective information in a market would be an insuperable task;
discovering all relevant subjective information would be impossible.
With no reliable measure of the subjective amenity value to the rancher,
an observer could never ascertain the island's optimal division between
pasture and forest, a matter that weighs more heavily as the article
proceeds.
The rancher suffers no similar uncertainty. She is both the
producer of timber and cattle and the producer (and consumer) of the
forest amenity, so she simply compares her utility from increasing the
amenity with utility that might be lost by foregoing market consumption
since any decrease in pasture will reduce pecuniary income.
Woodland provides the rancher two distinct benefits, a flow of
income from timber sales and a forest amenity that she finds in a copse
of mature trees. The amenity may or may not alter the pasture-forest
division. Ifadditional forest continues to create additional amenity value
statistical standards of confidence one model yielded predictions that accorded better with
factual observation, the evidence would be said to have refuted its competitor(s). Careless
commentators sometimes characterize such an outcome as having "verified" or "proven"
the non-refuted model. But each counterfactual contains numerous simplifying
assumptions -a few usually explicit, but a vast number implicit, many unrecognized even
by the model-builder-and any of those could be relaxed at some point. So there is
prospect of an even better fit with reality. It is less misleading to say simply that the
evidence has failed to refute whichever model still stands, while recognizing that
alternatives with different simplifying assumptions might yet do so.
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for the rancher as the forest gets larger than that which maximizes her
pecuniary income, the respective areas will change. 17 The forest will be
expanded, and what heretofore would have been a pointless sacrifice of
pecuniary income will have become an implicit price the rancher
willingly pays to expand the amenity she so enjoys. To borrow from
"Externality," the amenity is relevant to the rancher's boundary
placement between forest and pasture. 18 For brevity, call such an
amenity boundary-relevant.
But suppose the rancher cannot see the entire island at once and
can relax in any forest glade. Then the amenity, though valuable in total,
may have no value at the margin and as a result might be irrelevant for
deciding the island's forest-pasture division. Paradoxically then, an
amenity can simultaneously be as important but as marginally irrelevant
as oxygen is. Without oxygen we die; what could be more important?
Yet, there is so much oxygen floating freely in the atmosphere that
almost all of it is still there after the earth's n billion people have been
sated.' 9 And so it will sometimes be for an amenity. Perhaps the rancher
cherishes few things more than her beautiful woodland, but she is
satiated before its marginal amenity value has the least impact on her
division of the island between the two outputs. What a wonderful
situation! The rancher enjoys as much amenity as she wants (thus, until
its marginal value has fallen to zero) without sacrificing even a cent of
market income and the goods that buys. Where irrelevant externalities
are present, there really can be a free lunch. Those best things in life that

17. See Antony W. Dnes & Dean Lueck, Common Law, Statute Law and the Birth of
the Conservation Easement 20 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the offices
of the Natural Resources Journal).
18. Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 6. As their title suggests, Buchanan and
Stubblebine discuss "relevant" versus "irrelevant" solely in the context of externalities.
Obviously the concept is more broadly useful; as yet there are no externalities in this
article.
19. Consider the following:
What greater stupidity can be imagined than that of calling jewels, silver
and gold "precious," and earth and soil "base"? People who do this ought
to remember that if there were as great a scarcity of soil as jewels or
precious metals, there would not be a prince who would not spend a
bushel of diamonds and rubies and a cartload of gold just to have enough
earth to plant a jasmine in a little pot, or to sow an orange seed and watch
it sprout, grow, and produce its handsome leaves, its fragrant flowers and
fine fruit. It is scarcity and plenty that make the vulgar take things to be
precious or worthless; they call a diamond very beautiful because it is like
pure water, and then would not exchange one for ten barrels of water.
DAVID SOBEL, GALILEO'S DAUGHTER: A HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF SCIENCE, FAITH, AND LOVE

148 (1999) (excerpt from the character Sagredo in Galileo Galilei, l1Dialogo (1632)).
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actually are free (impose no opportunity cost) pose no economic problem
and beg for no solution.
Perhaps the reader will object that the marginal value of an
amenity never falls to zero, that more is inevitably better than less. In a
world without constraints and the tradeoffs constraints impose, that
notion would be correct, because then there would be no distinction
between preferences and value. But in a constrained world, rational
decisions cannot flow from pondering our unconstrained preferences but
rather from considering how much of one valuable thing you would be
willing to give up for an additional unit of another valuable thing. To
put the matter concretely, consider that while forest yields amenity value
so does seashore. If neither marginal value ever falls to zero, one receives
positive amenity value from each added bit of forest regardless of how
much forest there already is, so one's unconstrained preference would
always be for more forest. But since one also receives positive marginal
value from each added bit of seashore regardless of how much there is
already, one's preference would always be for more seashore. That
combination is internally inconsistent - eventually forest occupies so
much land that further expansion would require cutting into the
seashore and vice-versa. One is left wringing ones hands rather than
deciding how much forest there should be at the expense of seashore.
And of course there are not two but thousands of distinct sorts of land
use that yield amenity value (wetlands, desert, granite mountain faces,
and so on), so the problem is vastly more protracted.
Ah, the reader replies, one makes the decision between forest
and seashore by comparing the strength of the preferences. Exactly! The
reader has begun to practice economics. One decides whether to expand
the forest by comparing the value that one places on having more forest
with the opportunity cost of expanding it, which includes the value lost
from contracting the seashore or some other valuable land use. Possibly
without even realizing it, the rancher indirectly decides whether to
expand the forest by comparing that value with the cost (among other
things) of the added hunger that would result from reduced beef output.
Thus, the marginal amenity value of forest is measured not by
wishing for the impossible, but by gauging the amount of some other
valuable thing that one would be willing to give up to have a bit more
forest. One cannot place any substantial value on an unlimited amount
of forest because there is not an unlimited amount of other valuable
things (including of course seashore, wetlands, freedom from hunger,
and so on) that one can give up to obtain it.
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C. Second Party Environmental Amenities
Only those policy proposals that (given adequate data) might
plausibly lead to Kaldor-Hicks improvements are examined here. 20 But
in defining a clear starting point, the simplifying assumptions have
deleted so many of the complications that bedevil environmental
amenity provision that no such policy issues have arisen. This section
begins correcting that omission by relaxing the assumption that only the
rancher enjoys the amenity, with subsequent sections relaxing still other
assumptions.
1. Public Goods with and without a Public
Vessels begin passing, and the sailors admire the forested island
view. Hence, more people now enjoy an amenity once produced and
enjoyed solely by the rancher. In the argot of economics, the amenity is a
"public good" rather than a private one. Even with sailors involved, the
model rarely supports amenity-targeted policy initiatives.
When one asks randomly selected non-economists what they
take "private good" to mean, nearly everyone replies that a private good
is something that is owned by a human or a non-governmental
organization, as in "the blue car is my private property, but the red one
is not a private good; it belongs to the city government." If one asks the
same people what a "public good" might be, a common answer is that it
is something provided by the government to members of the public.
Some take it to be something available to every member of the public, for
example the public highways, but many also apply the term to things
such as public housing that are made available by the government only
to members of the public who meet particular criterion. A few people
will say simply that a public good is something owned by governmentthe red car in the illustration above - while ignoring the issue of who is
permitted to use it.
Those intuitions undoubtedly predate the formal distinction
between "private good" and "public good" in technical economics.
Unfortunately, the economic definitions imply something quite different
though they are now perhaps too ingrained to alter. To an economist, a
private good (which might better have been termed a rivalrous good) is
20. A Kaldor-Hicks improvement requires that a policy's beneficiaries would retain
some benefit even if required to compensate those who had been disadvantaged, though
the definition does not require that compensation actually be paid. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003). Pure transfers would be of no interest here.
Redistribution -even costly redistribution -is a legitimate topic of public debate but goes
well beyond environmental amenities and would pose a distraction.
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something such as an apple whose consumption by one person
forecloses consumption by anyone else-the eaten apple inevitably was
for someone's private consumption, even an apple that was provided to
that person by the government. The economic value of such a good is
measured by the most that any one person would exchange to obtain it if
giving up so much were unavoidable. For instance, if the rancher would
give up as much as $10 to be able to eat the island's only apple while
each passing sailor would give up as much as $5 to do so, the economic
value of the apple would be $10, the highest valuation of the lot. Private
goods pose a rationing problem solved in a market economy through the
price mechanism - if the rancher offers $6 for the apple, no sailor will top
the bid and the rancher will be said to have realized a consumer surplus
of $10 minus $6, or $4, while the seller will have realized a producer
surplus of $6 minus the apple's $5 opportunity cost (its value to a sailor),
or $1.
In contrast, in economic vocabulary, a public good is nonrivalrous in consumption, such as a television program that can be
enjoyed by many viewers-the entire public even-without depreciating
anyone's enjoyment of it. Using "public" as the modifier is perverse-a
view of the island forest was in fact a "public good" by that definition
even when the "public" consisted solely of the rancher. Her act of
viewing the forest left the view unaltered had there been anyone else
wanting to take a look (which there was not until the boats came alongdetails, details). As with a private good, the common economic definition
of public good makes its provider or owner irrelevant; it is what happens
when someone partakes that matters. 21 By eating it, a person removes an
apple from everyone else's opportunity set. But when that person enjoys
a television broadcast, any other interested viewer (if they exist) can
readily do likewise; no one should be troubled by the behavior of others,
nor even recognize that they exist. Indeed, since discovering others who
may be enjoying a public good imposes information costs but typically
no benefits, one's fellow consumers of a public good will usually remain
unidentified.
Since each person must have his own units in order to consume
private goods, the observer aggregates the interest of the entire market
by adding everyone's quantity demanded at a given monetary price. But
since many people can enjoy it simultaneously, the economic value of a
public good is measured not by any individual's valuation but rather by
21. "Many public goods are provided by private entities (most radio programs in the
United States for example) while governments often provide private goods (such as seats in
sports stadiums)." David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S545, S558 n.33 (2002).
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adding each different person's valuation at a given quantity. That is to
say, by summing the various maximum amounts that (if necessary) all
22
the different individuals would give up to obtain the (shared) amount.
Solely for pecuniary reasons, the rancher would divide her
island at one boundary but would increase the amount of forest at the
expense of pasture for the sake of the amenity value that she personally
received from the added woods providing the forest was boundaryrelevant. For concrete illustration, suppose that 15 land units had been
placed in the forest. If the rancher would sacrifice as much as $10 of
pecuniary income per year while each of ten passing sailors would give
as much as $5 apiece to enjoy the extra amenity from increasing the
wooded area from 15 to 16 units, the amenity value of that land would
be the sum of the individual values, or $60, since all eleven people could
view the same additional trees without troubling the others. 23 If the
rancher would sacrifice as much as $7 while each of the ten sailors would
give as much as $2 apiece for the amenity value of still another unit of
forest, the amenity value of the seventeenth timbered unit would be $27.
But the sailors would see the island less often than the rancher
and, being some distance offshore, they would be less likely to notice
small-scale "imperfections" where, for instance, a narrow tongue of
pasture intruded into the woods. Consequently, as the hypothetical's
numbers imply, the rancher might value the amenity more highly than
would any sailor, perhaps more highly even than all the sailors
combined. Similarly, she might value having beauty in places where
sailors would rarely glimpse it. In that event, the rancher might also
value a more extensive amenity than do the sailors. Thus, the rancher
might sacrifice as much as $4, but none of the sailors would be willing to
pay anything to expand the forest from 17 to 18 units, so the amenity
value of that unit of public good would simply be the rancher's private
valuation of $4. Similarly, the rancher might value even a fourth
additional unit by $1 though all sailors were satiated after two had been
added to the initial 15.
The nature of a public good permits everyone to consume it
simultaneously so it need pose no rationing problem. But the good must
nonetheless be paid for, so a free-rider problem can replace the rationing

22. Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 296
(1970).
23. Though jointly produced with the public good (the environmental forest amenity),
the rancher's timber that is growing there is a private good-when the rancher cuts and
everyone else is precluded from doing the same. The discounted value that the
sells it,
rancher attaches to future timber sales from a given plot is apart from and additional to the
subjective amenity value of the plot's forest that she experiences in the meantime.
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problem if non-paying users cannot be excluded. 24 In the model here, the
sailors are offshore and it will be assumed that the rancher's property
right permits no unilateral imposition of a fee though the sailors relish
the superb forested island view. If exclusion is impractical, as it has just
been assumed to be, a public good is called a collective good. 25
To illustrate the free-rider problem posed by collective goods,
suppose that converting one unit of pasture into a sixteenth unit of forest
would reduce annual cattle revenue by $250 while increasing annual
timber revenue by only $238. As contrasted with her private benefit from
the marginal amenity of $10 per year, that would imply that the
additional forest would cost the rancher $12 annually, the $250 of cattle
revenue foregone minus the $238 of additional timber revenue that could
be realized on the converted land. Calculated in an analogous way,
suppose that the second additional unit of forest would cost the rancher
$13, the third $14, and the fourth $15. Since the first two additional forest
units would provide amenity value of $60 and $27 respectively while
costing only $12 and $13, those two would become wooded in an ideal
world and there would be 17 units of forest rather than 15. The forest
amenity being worth only $4 but costing $14, the third unit would
remain pasture.
But since no individual realizes sufficient benefit from an
expanded forest, neither the rancher nor any individual sailor would
willingly pay for either of the first two units of forest expansion. A few of
them might join together to finance the expansions if they were
convinced that their contributions were essential to the project, but each
would prefer to have the other ten people contribute the entire amount.
If they all free ride, however, a potential Kaldor-Hicks improvement will
be frustrated. 26 An appropriate tax-expenditure scheme to pay for those
two forest units consequently offers a plausible prospect of a KaldorHicks improvement, though some commentators offer just as plausible a

24.

ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMIcs 475-77 (2d ed.

1969).
25. Demsetz, supra note 22, at 295.
26. Interestingly, if nine of the ten sailors discovered a more attractive place to sail, the
amenity value of the island's first additional forest unit would fall to $15 but free riding
would pose no barrier to obtaining it- both rancher and sailor would have to contribute or
too little financing would be available. There would remain a transaction cost as each
maneuvered to nudge the other's contribution up so their own could be moderated to that
extent, but even that cost is expected to decrease as the parties to negotiation fall.
Paradoxically, the minor Kaldor-Hicks improvement would seem easier to achieve than the
major one.
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prospect that the free riding could be overcome without sovereign
27
coercion.
But suppose that the rancher discovers a typographical error in
the published cattle price data and consequently has to reduce from $250
to $239 the estimated annual cattle revenue lost due to a first unit of
pasture-to-forest conversion, the increased annual timber revenue
remaining at $238. The cost of that first additional unit of forest will have
28
Suppose that, as a result of correcting the same
dropped from $12 to $1.
error, the estimated cost of converting the second unit drops from $13 to
$2, the third from $14 to $3, and the fourth from $15 to $4. The third unit
of new forest, increasing amenity value by $4 while costing only $3, is
now worth adding. That unit may comprise a public good in the
economist's sense since consumption is non-rivalrous, but the public
interest can hardly be implicated -only the rancher is willing to make
any sacrifice to obtain that third unit. No opportunity to free ride on that
unit presents itself, nor does transaction cost create any market failure
since the rancher could find nobody to transact with.
A remarkable finding has emerged: if the tax-expenditure
scheme envisioned above provides the two extra units that are valued by
a multi-person public, the rancher will add the third unit of her own
volition. But if there is no public provision of the first two extra units, the
rancher will add all three of her own volition since their worth to her
alone is $10, $7, and $4 respectively, while their cost to her is $1, $2, and
$3. A positive externality exists since the sailors can readily view the
island forest while bearing none of the cost, but the externality is
irrelevant. The public's valuation of the amenity is thus boundaryirrelevant, "public" being used in the ordinary rather than technical
economic sense. There will be the same amount of forest-18 unitseither way, the first 15 plus the eighteenth provided at the rancher's
expense if the government taxes to subsidize the sixteenth and
seventeenth, all 18 provided by the rancher otherwise! Thus, even
Demsetz, who is quite sanguine regarding the private provision of
excludable public goods, overstates the problem with respect to
collective goods, "the private production of collective goods, for which

27. See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENvIRO-CAPITALISTS:

DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL (1997); Terry Anderson, Viewing Land Conservation
Through Coase-Colored Glasses, 44 NAT. RESOURcES J. (2004). This article skirts that empirical
debate.
28. The $1 conversion cost is the difference between the alternatives of $239 cattle
revenue or $238 timber revenue. A modest correction of hay, timber, or transport prices
could have an analogous impact on the estimated conversion cost.
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the cost of excluding nonpurchasers is great, does not seem to be
practical." 29
No doubt the rancher would prefer to be paid for planting those
two units (but why stop there, the rancher would prefer to be paid for
planting all 18!), while taxpayers would prefer not to be coerced into
making those payments. Apart from that wealth effect, are the
alternative routes for obtaining the forest expansion equivalent? For now
the answer seems to be yes. The answer becomes clouded when the
simplifying assumption that information is costless is relaxed, a task
delayed a moment yet. With costly information one will find that the taxexpenditure route will more often miss the ideal and will likely miss it
by greater magnitudes due to miscalculation of the true costs and
benefits of marginal amenity enhancements.
The discussion also illustrates a more subtle point -the cost of
increasing the forested area depended (among many other things) on the
prices of cattle and hay and transport in addition to the price of timber.
Imagine that there were some other island nearby where expanding the
forest would curtail the area planted in asparagus. Then, the cost of the
forest amenity would depend also on asparagus prices and the wages
paid to those harvesting it. With other diverse islands in the chain, each a
plausible locale for forest and for pleasurable sailing, the number of
margins along which the forest amenity abuts incompatible uses could
defy any manageable accounting. Economic costs are not dollars (mere
proxies to facilitate recording and comparing dissimilar things) but the
value of the multifarious opportunities foregone, and those costs are
difficult to gauge by anyone not closely involved in the activities.
2. Could a Million Sailors Be Wrong?

One would naturally have thought that more users would
require more of an amenity and that adding ten forest-loving sailors to a
world that previously had only one forest-loving rancher would increase
the ideal amount of forest. That intuition reflects the familiarity most of
us have with private goods coupled with substantial ignorance
regarding public goods. Providing they are willing to pay at least the
marginal cost of production of a private good, it is efficient that even
those with relatively weak demands have an impact on its output, as
they do in a competitive market. 30 If the ten sailors begin to use the
29. Demsetz, supra note 22, at 306.
30. Even where markets exhibit monopoly influence, relatively weak demands for
private goods commonly induce some output response -though very weak demands may
well be ignored.
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mainland grocery where the rancher customarily buys her grub, the shop
owner will definitely find it advisable to add inventory.
Those with weak demands for a public good often have no
impact on its ideal amount even if they would be willing to pay marginal
production cost for a unit. That is not because they are excluded but
because they can be satiated without any expansion -they piggyback on
stronger demands. Those with the strongest demands will, if necessary,
be willing to pay for, and may indeed pay for, so much of the public
good that those with weaker demands are unwilling to pay to have one
unit more.31 With sailors now in the model, the text from above can aptly
be paraphrased: Those with weak demands value the amenity -perhaps
they enjoy few things more keenly-but they are satiated before their
preferences have the least impact on an ideal amenity provision. They
enjoy as much amenity as they want (thus, until its marginal value to
them has fallen to zero) without requiring the expenditure of a cent more
than is required to satisfy stronger demands. A few strong demands,
perhaps just a single one, may completely determine the optimal amount
of a public good.
The arrival of boats carrying forest-loving sailors may or may
not alter the optimal allocation between pasture and forest. If it does not,
the amenity remains esthetically important to the sailors but their
demand for it is boundary-irrelevant and thus raises no policy issue. But
suppose the sailors' presence means that the ideal woodland would be
larger (their arrival creates or strengthens the boundary-relevance of the
amenity). Still, no policy issue arises if that ideal is reflected in the
rancher's voluntary decisions. Consider those points in turn.
Boundary Relevance: In order for the boats to alter the optimal
amount of the amenity it is necessary and sufficient that the most
extensive sailor demand for the amenity exceeds the rancher's demand
to be boundary relevant if the rancher's demand is not. That is plausible
even though the rancher sees more of the forest and sees it more often
providing she has a weak taste for looking at forest compared to at least
one sailor's liking for such views. But if the rancher's amenity demand is
boundary relevant, a sailor may have an impact on the optimal amount

31. Menahem Spiegel, Charity Without Altruism, 33 EcoN. INQUIRY 625, 627 (1995).
Common law courts have perhaps been more successful than economists in distinguishing
irrelevant from relevant externalities. Courts in all states except Louisiana, for example,
have implicitly decided that the externality in alienation of affection case is irrelevant- the
new pairing would be consummated even if the couple took full account of the interests of
the disappointed spouse. N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) reaches a similar
result with respect to inadvertent libel.
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of the amenity even if his demand is less extensive than the rancher's. 32
Amenity value will be lost if the rancher does not make that adjustment
of her own volition, though the loss will be overstated if one focuses
strictly on the marginal amenity that is missed by a failure to expand the
wooded area while ignoring its opportunity cost, the value of producing
beef on that same land. A tax-expenditure inducement to the rancher to
expand the forest offers a plausible prospect of avoiding that KaldorHicks loss, though the requisite governmental process will impose costs
of its own, and they might plausibly swamp any gain from correcting the
shortfall.
The Rancher's Reaction: If transaction cost were modest, the
rancher would move the boundary without governmental inducement
because she would be paid to do so by those enjoying the enhanced
amenity. But with ten sailors offshore enjoying the amenity, how likely is
it that the transaction cost would be low?
With the amenity being a public good, low transaction cost is
substantially more likely than one might have expected. If, counterfactually, the amenity were a private good, the number of necessary
interactions would depend on the number of sailors. Although there are
ten sailors offshore enjoying the forested view, some sailors will have
more extensive demands for the public good than others, so it requires
no stretch to imagine that on some (perhaps many) occasions the second
most extensive sailor's demand will be boundary irrelevant given the
first sailor's presence.
Then, it hardly matters how many sailors are offshore, ten or a
million; only the most extensive sailor's demand is boundary relevant,
and one rancher negotiating with that lone especially interested sailor
hardly compels a conclusion that the negotiation will be overwhelmed
by transaction cost. Most people bear that level of transaction cost, and
more, virtually nonstop -buying a house, buying a car, negotiating for a
job, planning fence replacement with a neighbor, attracting a spouse, and
so on. Even if several sailors have boundary-relevant demands, the cost
of using the government to seek an optimal forest amenity could dwarf
the cost of a private multiparty negotiation. Indeed, as one suspects,
negotiating for a collective good with a million sailors would almost
certainly be prohibitively costly. But such diverse involvement would
hardly ever be needed-worse than pointless actually-though all
million fully enjoy the amenity. If a hundred sailors from the million had
32. The point is difficult to prove discursively but can easily be shown with more
rigorous tools. See David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 31 ICER WORKING PAPER
SERIEs 13 (2003), availableat http://ideas.repec.org/s/icr/wpicer.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2004).
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boundary-relevant demands, a public action problem would exist,
though one much less extensive than would have been imagined. If only
a few of the million have boundary-relevant demands, the matter might
best be left to private negotiation.
In brief, a boundary-relevant public amenity does not necessarily
create a useful policy issue. Having a million sailors nearby may indeed
mean that more of the island's territory ideally would be wooded. But if
transaction cost is modest between the rancher and one or a few of the
million who have an especially extensive demand for the amenity, the
rancher will collect a side payment and make the adjustment. It will
become the rancher's interest to expand the forest without any
government's intrusion. Going beyond economic terminology to
rephrase the point, one sailor or a few of them who are strongly
interested can purchase an environmental easement from the rancher,
compensating her for the reduction in pecuniary income that she
experiences when expanding her forest to what, without the sailors'
amenity demands, would have been an excessive size. Given the
information and transaction cost of identifying consumers of the amenity
coupled with the paucity of most of the valuations at the margin, it
seems unlikely that the rancher would have adequate incentive to coax
contributions from the other beneficiaries.
An advantage of private negotiation is that the rancher already
is attuned to the local cattle and timber markets, to local transport, to the
prices of hay and all the other inputs she uses on her island.
Consequently, she can cheaply judge the opportunity cost of expanding
the island forest. Bureaucrats can find objective market measures for
some of those variables, but they would have to collect, at some cost,
information the rancher acquires in the course of business. Moreover the
few sailors with whom the rancher would negotiate are the only reliable
judges of the subjective value to them of the expanded amenity, just as
she is the only reliable judge of the additional amenity value to her.
There are at best only extremely poor market proxies for those subjective
values.
Clearly the model does not preclude transaction cost so high as
to frustrate optimal amenity provision. But such a prospect is too readily
conceded in policy discussions, with minds attuned to private goods,
where more demanders nearly always imply more individuals with a
marginally relevant interest. One or a few strong demands for a public
good often determine not merely the actual but also the ideal quantity. In
consequence, transaction cost for environmental amenities-even those
enjoyed by a million sailors-are chronically overestimated. Not
everyone who may enjoy the amenity is relevant to policy discussions,
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only the smaller number who would enjoy boundary-relevant marginal
increases.
One's intuition rebels against such a conclusion. There must be
too many boundary-relevant demands for, say, Yellowstone National
Park for reasonable people to expect private negotiations to suffice. A
park that seemed huge a century ago when few people could afford the
time and expense to get there seems deficient now that it has become
crowded.
Perhaps Yellowstone represents an instance where high
transaction cost might frustrate optimal expansion; without data the
article can make no claim regarding that empirical issue. 33 The words
"might" and "did," of course, are different- speaking counterfactually,
the present congestion of Yellowstone might have arisen from a high
transaction cost frustrating optimal private amenity provision; but
speaking factually, it did arise despite more than a century of control by
the national government. We have no recent evidence regarding private
provision of capacity in Yellowstone, though in the 1800s people were
able to enjoy its amenities solely as a result of private efforts by railroad
companies. Motivated by company rather than public benefit, the
railroads then lobbied influentially for national government (and
national treasury) involvement. 34
All of that, however, is largely beside the point. Even during low
season when the Yellowstone amenities are a public good, they are not a
collective good since it is easy to exclude non-payers at the gate. But park
congestion during recent decades implies that during high season the
amenity has become a private good. It is impossible for one to visit the
park during the summer without diminishing others' enjoyment. One's
very presence contributes to crowded campgrounds, congested roads,
and delayed meal service. Then, there are the sightlines impeded by all
those annoying vehicles. In a market economy private goods are rationed
by prices, but the National Park Service holds the price too low to clear
the market during Yellowstone's high season. So, like an experiment in
elementary microeconomics, there is a shortage of elbowroom.
Transaction cost is not the problem; the problem is the price being
charged. The transaction cost for providing park admittance as a private
33. Even if Yellowstone requires public control, whether it would be better exercised
by the United States, by Wyoming, or by a specialized unit encompassing northwestern
Wyoming, southwestern Montana, and eastern Idaho is unclear as a matter of theory. See
supranote 9.
34. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, AppropriableRents from Yellowstone Park:A Case of
Incomplete Contracting, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 506, 510 (1996); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill,
Rents from Amenity Resources: A Case Study of Yellowstone National Park, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 113,118 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1994).
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good is the cost of rangers at the various entrances collecting a fee from
one automobile at a time. That cost is being borne already and is
substantially lower than the transaction cost a Dakotan bears to purchase
a new pair of shoes.
Proposals to control park congestion by increasing entry fees
invariably spark indignant complaints that the poor would then be
excluded while the rich would continue to be admitted. But the vastly
greater expenses of travel and lodging exclude most of the poor already.
After struggling to overcome that burden, the rare poor person lucky
enough to reach a national park would barely notice an increase in the
comparatively modest entry fee.
Assuming that park visits were the most urgent of the many
things poor people do without, a more efficacious program might
subsidize bus travel from poor neighborhoods, even financing it from
the increased entry fees that would in turn limit the aggregate number of
vehicles in the park.35 Many rich people would no doubt pay the
increased tolls and continue to drive their vehicles into the park, but that
would mean they, rather than the general taxpayers, were subsidizing
visits by the poor - and the rich would be doing it voluntarily by
purchasing, at a fair market price, something they want. The poor (and
everyone else) could better enjoy the amenity after arriving.36
Existence of an environmental amenity does not create a policy
issue by itself. Even an amenity enjoyed by a large public leads to no
policy issue if its marginal (not total) value is driven to zero by
landowners' own utility maximizing decisions. Even if the amenity's
marginal value remains positive after the landowner has completed her
autonomous decisions, no policy issue arises unless transaction cost is
daunting enough to seriously hamper negotiations for an easement that
would induce the landowner to take other marginally relevant interests
into account. With reasonable interpersonal variance in amenity
demands, only a minority of the public will be boundary relevant, so
exorbitant transaction cost is hardly inevitable. For a public issue to exist,
35. Milton Friedman would likely remark, "The poor are not poor because they can't
visit Yellowstone; they are poor because they don't have more money. If they had more
money perhaps they would choose to visit national parks, but why should the public use
government to dictate that outcome?" Thus, even one wishing to enhance park fees
specifically to finance increased aid for the poor could easily find more efficacious uses for
such funds than subsidized park visits.
36. Many who will drive their jumbo-sized recreational vehicles into the national parks
in any event readily play the "poor card" merely to conceal their efforts to limit their own
entry fees but would be outraged by any potentially effective plan that threatened to
deliver actual poor people there. Such treasury-subsidized limits are regressive in that the
actual poor so rarely benefit while more comfortable citizens do.
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it is necessary that the amenity be public in both the common and the
economist's senses, that exclusion be impractical, that the amenity be
marginally relevant, and that negotiating easements be seriously
burdened by transaction cost. But that is not enough-for a number of
reasons that will be investigated below, even those are necessary
conditions, not sufficient ones. But first the article detours briefly
through a real world application.
3. Two Meanings of FreeRange Bison
A small public road traverses the Flying D Ranch in
southwestern Montana, wending its way between a highway in the
Gallatin Valley and a Spanish Peaks campsite. Ranch owner and media
mogul 'led Turner is wealthy and loves wildlife. Due in part to his
willingness to invest, the ranch puts some national parkland to shame.
Turner, a Georgian, visits Montana infrequently enough to require a fulltime overseer to operate the ranch. A bison herd was established on the
Flying D as a commercial operation-for meat, not tourist fees. But until
they are shipped the bison are there to be seen by motorists passing
along the road, along with raptors, coyotes, grizzly bears, and other
wildlife that find a living at the herd's margin. Turner charges nothing
for the excellent views of his ranch that are easily seen from the state
road; indeed, he can legally charge nothing. So what?
Many drivers passing along the road place a high absolute value
on viewing Turner's ranch but would pay nothing for further
improvement in it. Given his wealth and his taste for a particular sort of
landscape with its flora and fauna, Turner paid for all improvements to
the Flying D that were worth more to him personally than they cost him,
and in the process the marginal value of improvements to the rest of us
has been driven to zero. We free ride on Turner's efforts, but it hardly
matters. The ranch will be the same whether we pass through or not, and
whether we pay Turner or not. If Turner altered the ranch further,
passersby would rarely notice the improvements. Of course, Turner
would notice or he would not finance it, but that is a private rather than
public amenity according to the common meanings of those terms. Our
free riding per se does not justify non-market additions to the valley's
environmental amenities.
Turner's ranch provides a dramatic illustration of the point, but
there are many others both grand and modest. Only miles south of
Turner's ranch, for instance, lies Moonlight Basin athwart a pass that
links the Gallatin River Valley at Big Sky, Montana, with the Madison
River Valley at Ennis. The area might have become the site of literally
thousands of vacation cottages. Instead, a developer voluntarily
committed most of the territory to permanent wilderness, financing it
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through a resulting multiplication of value for the few home sites that
remained. Those few dwellings are difficult for passersby to notice, and
it is only because they are surrounded by wilderness that they are so
valuable. But the wilderness atmosphere is palpable whether or not one
paid for a home site. On a smaller scale, a few neighbors often
amalgamate modest individual contributions to realize an unusually
intense localized benefit, yet simultaneously provide irrelevant external
benefits to passersby. Need gardens be subsidized if pedestrians enjoy
seeing and smelling the flowers?
D. Bilateral Environmental Amenities
The rancher and the sailors like to look at forest, but it seems
unlikely that anyone would much care to look at pasture-until one
remembers that a well-tended pasture is in fact a meadow. People
demonstrably like to nestle among the trees, but people (perhaps the
same people, perhaps different ones) also like to look at wildlife.
Holding the population of animals constant, adding trees makes viewing
most sorts more difficult. Since mature trees capture a great deal of
sunlight high above the ground and thus reduce understory vegetation,
forests also reduce the population of particular sorts of animals such as
ungulates and ground dwelling birds, elephants and some types of
primates in Africa, kangaroos in Australia, and so on. With fewer
ground dwelling prey animals, the population of their predators is
reduced. On the other hand, some people prefer to see forest dwelling
animals and the cats and raptors that prey on them. Evidently, there
could be too much meadow crowding out forest or too much forest
crowding out meadow. Similarly, depending on one's taste, too much or
too little of the meadow can be of a short-grass variety just as too much
or too little of the forest can be deciduous.
1. Sleeping Beauty in a Pasture
Forests and meadows are incompatible uses of land, but each
can provide environmental amenities. That means that what might have
struck one initially as a boundary-relevant amenity urging intervention
of one sort may actually imply an entirely contrary conclusion. Because
there is competition not just between environmental and market goods
but among environmental goods of alternative sorts, erroneous policies
are the likely result if the focus is solely on one or the other amenity.
Thus, quite apart from the difficulties a bureaucracy experiences if it
attempts accurately to gauge costs and benefits of a given amenity,
especially the subjective costs and benefits, the bureaucracy could
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plausibly intensify rather than alleviate a deficiency by improperly
weighing the amenities.
Suppose that those who appreciate the forest amenity are
politically influential while meadow-lovers have difficulty organizing
and communicating their preferences. Suppose that as a result the
bureaucracy compels or persuades the rancher to increase the island
forest at the expense of meadow. That policy could well move the
boundary away from rather than toward the ideal island division and
represent a Kaldor-Hicks deterioration rather than an improvementeven in principle those who lose could not possibly be fully compensated
from the beneficiaries' gains. Indeed, it can be shown that the loss
expands geometrically as one moves away from the ideal. 37 A
bureaucratic error that is equal to the original deviation from the ideal
but in the wrong direction will, roughly speaking, quadruple the
amenity loss. Even though our confidence may be high that laissez-faire
leads to some welfare loss vis-A-vis the ideal, it does not follow that the
loss is economically significant.38 Instead, the relevant question is
whether that laissez-faire loss is greater than those of plausible
alternative policies that also, we may be confident, lead to some degree
of welfare losses vis-A-vis the ideal. 39
Alternatively, suppose that the deviation from the ideal is small
and that the bureaucracy accurately perceives its direction and acts to
correct it. Even that may decrease environmental values if bureaucratic
inability to correctly estimate the relative costs and benefits causes it to
overshoot the ideal by even a small amount. Gross deviations from the
ideal are likely to be easier to discern than are smaller ones, and the
direction if not the magnitude of correction is similarly more likely to be
apparent. But as has been argued over the last few paragraphs and
demonstrated elsewhere, 4° small deviations from the ideal are likely to
impose relatively little cost on society when gauged against the cost of
even minor misjudgments regarding their correction. For a society as
well as an individual, it is important to recognize the distinction between
a problem and an inconvenience. 41
37. See Haddock, supra note 32, at Part II.
38. See generally D.N. McCloskey, The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of
Significance Tests, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (1985).
39. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1969).
40. Haddock, supra note 32.
41. According to Robert Fulghum,
"Life is inconvenient. Life is lumpy. You learn to know the difference
between an inconvenience and a problem. You'll live longer."...Problem
or inconvenience? I call this the [Auschwitz survivor Sigmund] Wollman
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The discussion may actually have understated the difficulty of
bureaucratically fine-tuning the amenity. Suppose that, contrary to all
expectation, the bureaucracy actually manages to identify the ideal
division between forest and meadow. Unfortunately, the values that led
them there are likely to shift constantly as market prices of cattle, timber,
hay, transport, and the like and the value of boundary-relevant amenity
demands fluctuate. That means that, while the selected area may have
been ideal yesterday, it is unlikely to be nearly as good an approximation
tomorrow. Of course, if the bureaucrats could obtain a tolerable estimate
of yesterday's ideal it is as likely that they can obtain a tolerable estimate
of tomorrow's as well. But how will that be done? It can be done only by
canvassing those affected in one way or another by the island's
production and its amenity, hence by obtaining, at some cost,
information that private participants already possess. Due at least in part
to that greater cost of information, bureaucratic decision making tends
toward inflexibility and sudden, large, episodic change, more akin to
flash floods than smoothly flowing streams.
Laissez-faire losses are not ideal, but they may be optimal given
the bureaucracy's innate disability in acquiring essential information,
especially subjective costs and benefits, coupled with a danger that the
bureaucracy will bias its process to favor the politically powerful. In
contrast, if there are only a few boundary-relevant demanders for forest
and meadow amenities, there are only a handful of private parties
required for negotiation. In that instance, prohibitive transaction cost is
hardly inevitable. And reliance on private negotiation rather than
government regulation would avoid the danger of exacerbating an
amenity shortfall.
For instance, the rancher might put environmental easements
over successive units of her ranch up for bid, and the successful bidder is
then permitted to limit the uses to which the plot could be put with the
rancher retaining a residual right to capture the commercial output. In
that way, the parties themselves, being knowledgeable about both the
objective and subjective costs and benefits of adjustments on the island,
might well achieve the ideal division of the island between forest and
meadow.

Test of Reality. Life is lumpy. But a lump in the oatmeal -a lump in the
throat - and a lump in the breast - are not the same lump. We should learn
to know the difference.
ROBERT FULGHUM, Problems and Inconveniences, in ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED
IN KINDERGARTEN 43-46,46 (dramatic adaptation by Ernest Zulia; music & lyrics by David
Caldwell, Dramatic Publ. Co. 1998).
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Failure to leave a demonstrably faulty environment alone
occasionally leads to dire consequences, as the following brief
application illustrates.
2. Would That We Had Suffered Only Neglect
An extended, widespread drought afflicted much of the United
States during the 1930s. Parched farms were denuded as rains failed for
several years running. Then, gales began stripping topsoil, depositing it
where more fertile soil's vegetation broke the wind. The former plots
were receding toward subsoil; the latter were being buried under an
inferior overlay. Natural processes take years to repair such damage.
Since wind can blow from any direction and wind-borne dust easily
travels for tens, hundreds, or even thousands of miles, prohibitive
transaction cost made it impractical for the many owners of superior
land to persuade the many owners of devegetated land to undertake
costly erosion control.
The federal government intervened on a number of fronts, some
effective but others not. One of the latter offered a bounty to southern
farmers who planted a hardy, drought-resistant Asian groundcover that
almost completely eliminated wind erosion. After a few years the
drought ended, but the plant-kudzu-had become entrenched across
the region. 42 Kudzu has never contributed to a commercial product more
substantial than hand crafted baskets and goat's milk cheese, but it was
certainly able to defeat desiccation and wind - and every competing
form of vegetation, including trees of virtually any height. Kudzu can
even engulf, invade, and destroy buildings if energetic defenses are not
mounted. The vines grow 60 feet per year, send regenerative roots at
least ten feet deep, and have laid waste to vast swaths of southeastern
farms, forest, parkland, and even military bases. Kudzu has now reached
New York State, and recently a nascent patch was discovered within five
miles of my Evanston, Illinois, home. Cold winters seem barely to retard
kudzu's northward progress. Kudzu can be managed in a low labor cost
(hence low opportunity cost of labor, hence impoverished) nation like
China, but it poses a very serious problem in a wealthy, high labor cost
region such as the United States. Harsh chemicals take ten years or more
to eradicate the plant and pose an environmental concern of their own.
The soil erosion problems of the 1930s posed a prohibitive
transaction cost. The political initiative that encouraged kudzu's spread
successfully responded to several years of drought but has now resulted
42.
at Al.

Dahleen Glanton, South Struggles in the Clutches of Kudzu, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2002,
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in two-thirds of a century of growing cost and environmental damage
with no end in sight. A better reaction would surely have been neglect leave resources as they lie. High transaction cost suggests a possibility
that political action is desirable but does not compel any such result. It
should merely advance analysis to the next phase.
E. Government Policy Regarding Environmental Easements
It is time to relax one of the article's least convincing simplifying
assumptions, that government policies are neutral. For better or worse,
supplanting market divisions between incompatible land uses has been a
political mainstay in North America since colonial times. 43 Some
government policies have collaterally diminished environmental
amenities that might better have been retained. Other policies have
intentionally augmented amenities well beyond the level at which
marginal cost has matched any plausible marginal benefit. The U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) obliges with numerous examples of each sort.
As one example of an amenity-diminishing USFS policy,
consider that much national forest logging is anticipated from the
planning stage to cost substantially more than the projected output
value. Private companies harvest timber on those sites only because
taxpayers rather than logging companies bear a substantial burden for
logging roads, surveys, fire suppression, pest control and the like, while
the royalty per tree is set at ridiculously low levels. 44 Often those logging
43. See King George III, Royal Proclamation of 1763, available at http://www.bloor
street.com/200block/rp1763.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) (a significant contributor to the
outbreak of the Revolutionary War, which attempted to monopolize in the King's hands all
negotiations for the purchase of tribal lands and to determine by royal decree which parts
could then be settled by immigrants; through the Constitution, the government of the
United States retained the restrictions and the collateral hostility of those most eager to
settle the new nation's western reaches).
44. States and counties cannot rely on the national treasury to subsidize their forest
operations and predictably report much better cost-benefit ratios. In Montana, "state forests
averaged $2.16 in.. .revenues for every dollar in expenditures, while nine of ten national
forests averaged between $.09 and $.73." Donald R. Leal, Turning a Profit on Public Forests,
PERC POLICY SERIES PS-4 (Jane S. Shaw ed., 1995), available at http://www.perc.org
/publications/policyseries/turning-full.php?s=2 (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
[Leal's] results are no fluke. Combined results from Montana,
Washington, Idaho, and Oregon show the.. national forest average yield
in 1996 was $.93 in timber revenues for each dollar spent on the timber
sales program. State-managed forests yielded $7.42 in revenue for each
dollar in costs -an eightfold performance margin for the state-managed
lands.
It might be thought that the states' lower costs are the result of
skimping on environmental protection, but in fact, just the opposite
appears to be true. Evaluations carried out by independent audit teams
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roads are permanent and of a much higher caliber than is required for
logging, while fire suppression has been overenthusiastic, resulting in a
bank of unburned deadfall on the forest floor that itself has become a
major threat to forest health.45 Such policies generate logging industry
votes for senators and representatives from the states involved, as well
as support from locals who use the roads provided by taxpayers
everywhere but at the expense of excessive depletion of environmental
amenities. Similarly, politically popular Bureau of Land Management
and Bureau of Indian Affairs policies induce serious over-grazing and
erosion across large areas of both government and tribal lands.
Other national forest locales provide examples of excessive
rather than deficient bureaucratic provision of environmental amenities
of particular sorts. Though so unattractive a proposition for timber
production that even USFS subsidies leave logging privately unviable,
remote and rarely visited places would sometimes be attractive locations
for low-density vacation cottages, dispersed ski or hunting lodges,
campgrounds, and the like. But those uses often are forbidden by edict,
and merely obtaining lawful permission for low-impact transit can be
difficult.
A common argument against permitting cottages, lodges, and
campsites in such locales is that if permits were given out only the rich
would be able to afford the substantial expense of building on or even
visiting such out-of-the-way places. In some instances that would
probably be true. But why give such permits away? If an only-the-rich
argument is to be credited, it follows that the rich would be willing and
able to pay fees, and once in the public treasury dollars look the same
wherever they originated, whether fees collected voluntarily from the
rich or tax dollars collected compulsorily from the poor. So, as with the
earlier discussion of increased national park fees, the rich could be
induced to make an enlarged contribution to other government services.
Rich or poor, people do not so much oppose paying the government as
they oppose paying any entity that provides an inadequate offsetting
benefit. Having an option to pay to use a beautiful and remote vacation,
ski, hunting, or camping site would seem to offer such an offset.

(which include state, federal, and industry experts and representatives
from environmental groups) show that environmental protection and
economic performance go hand in hand. State forests rated higher than
the national forests in mitigating the impacts from logging and protecting
watersheds.
Holly Lippke Fretwell, The Untouchables: America's National Forests, in GOVERNMENT VS.
ENVIRONMENT 123,126-27 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002).
45. Fretwell, supra note 44, at 130-34.
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So, some government policies lead to deficient environmental
amenities while other policies lead to excessive areas elsewhere being
reserved for them. As a substitute, public subsidies for environmental
easements (commonly via a tax allowance) are increasingly being used to
counter total reliance on bureaucratic decision making. Easements retain
some commercial use that jointly affords environmental amenities, such
as forest that periodically is cropped for timber or meadows where deer
and beaver mingle with cattle. The easements simultaneously forbid
other commercial uses that would severely attenuate the environmental
amenities, such as shopping centers or dense housing developments.
The motivation for substituting subsidized private initiative for
bureaucratic discretion is both straightforward and intuitively appealing:
While a USFS decision might alter, say, a forest in Idaho despite the
decision maker never having even been in the state, a private party
would devote personal resources to Idaho's environmental concerns
only when that alteration is understood and valued. But, so the
argument continues, non-investing citizens also benefit, so unsubsidized
private efforts would be deficient.
Substituting private for bureaucratic initiative has a great deal to
recommend it, but proposals to subsidize the change require at least
three caveats:
* First, as discussed above, unsubsidized financing by one or a
few citizens sometimes leads to appropriate amenity provision. Even if
there are many people who enjoy it, the amenity is a public good, and
only one or a few such individuals may have boundary-relevant
demands, plausibly only the owner. Then there will be no free-rider
problem to be overridden. Indeed, any subsidy in such instances will
induce excessively costly amenity provisions.
* Second, even when there are many boundary-relevant
demands for a particular amenity, using tax incentives to mitigate a
potential free-rider problem distorts decisions. Since they stand to
receive the largest tax breaks, the particular amenity demands of those
with higher wealth will become increasingly influential in determining
which amenities are expanded. In contrast, those with lower wealth
stand to receive little if any tax benefit from personally making
investments in amenities. Unless amenity demands are highly correlated
across wealth, low-wealth individuals will remain as vulnerable as ever
to free riding and amenity under-provision. Worse still, the sorts of
amenities that the poor especially value may actually be driven out
where alternative sorts of amenities are incompatible, as they were in the
forest-meadow discussion above.
0 Third, tax allowances routinely facilitate a multi-stage
expansion of bureaucratic purview without requiring any congressional
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vote. Rather than providing a way for citizens to overcome bureaucratic
hubris, tax offsets for amenity provision can become a way for
bureaucrats to evade what little citizen scrutiny they receive through the
political system. Consider those three caveats in turn.
1. Subsidizing Provision of EnvironmentalAmenities
This section considers subsidized environmental amenities while
abstracting from the nature of the subsidy, whether tax allowance, inkind transfer or direct payment. 46 As was true earlier in the article, it will
initially be assumed that only forest provides amenity value. The rancher
would provide the ideal amount of forest voluntarily if transaction cost
were low, as if one or a few sailors have boundary-relevant demands.
But in that instance' any subsidy obviously threatens excessively costly
amenity provision.
Hence, it is necessary for transaction cost to be high enough to
prevent bargaining for subsidies to make sense. The division of the
island then would have taken full account of the rancher's utility from
the amenity, though the sailors' demands would be underserved, as
opposed to unserved-they are advantaged by the rancher's chosen
border, though there remains a shortfall from the ideal.
A subsidy for forest increases the net pecuniary returns to the
rancher from devoting land to that purpose without affecting the
pecuniary returns from pasture. Assuming that the subsidy is directly
related to the amount of land in forest, it increases the marginal private
value to the rancher of each acre of forestland. Hence, the subsidy
increases the amount of amenity-providing forest, as it should.
But if the subsidy is too generous it will overshoot the mark, and
there is good reason to expect that it will indeed be too generous.
First, the sailors receive amenity value from forest expansion but
barely have to pay anything for it since only a minuscule part of the
subsidy collected by the rancher would have to be paid by the minority
of the public enjoying the amenity. Hence, the sailors' criterion for
lending political support will not be the appropriate one-whether the
added benefit exceeds the added cost-but only whether the added
benefit is positive.
Second, as the rancher is being subsidized rather than compelled
to provide forest, each additional unit will increase her income. So, she
too will support the subsidy. Indeed, she would lend political support to

46. The next section extends the analysis of mutually incompatible environmental
amenities, with a focus specifically on tax allowances as opposed to other sorts of subsidy.
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subsidies large enough to induce voluntary conversion of the entire
island to forest.
Third, otherwise uninvolved taxpayers will bear the brunt of
subsidy financing without receiving any benefit from it. But individually
they bear a modest cost as it is divided across the entire population
rather than across a few sailors and a rancher. Hence, uninvolved
taxpayers are likely to be rationally ignorant, rationally apathetic, and,
thus, politically silent regarding this particular subsidy, though the cost
aggregated over all taxpayers must equal the subsidy the rancher
receives plus the tax authority's cost of administering the program,
which takes no account of the opportunity cost of lost beef.
In summary, those who receive the benefits of the subsidy are
apt to be politically vocal, while those who bear the costs are likely to be
ignorant of it and hence silent. 47 The bureaucracy will hear nothing but
support for its subsidy so amenity provision will be excessive. As a first
approximation, excessive land in forest is as costly per unit area as is
deficient land in forest. To revive the numerical examples employed
above, the private outcome with prohibitive transaction cost would be 15
land units in forest whereas the ideal would be 17 units. A subsidy that
is so generous that it induces a forest expansion to 20 units would likely
more than double the net loss from inappropriate amenity provision
(now excessive rather than deficient).48
2. Regressive Tax Effects
Viewed narrowly, financing environmental amenities through
tax allowances is regressive given the present tax structure. Or, viewed
more broadly, financing environmental amenities through tax
allowances undoes some of the present structure's progressivity.
Certainly some people favor a less progressive tax structure, but
employing tax allowances to induce environmental investments is a
backhanded way to make marginal tax rates less progressive. And it
introduces additional distortions, as will now be discussed.
Wealthy people make greater direct tax payments than poor
people. Wealthy people are more likely to be in a position to claim a
property tax write-off. They pay higher marginal income tax rates.
Suppose that wealthy people value one particular sort of environmental
amenity, such as remote wilderness areas that can be enjoyed only after
substantial expenditure for travel and lodging. Suppose that people of
47. See generally Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTON: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
48. See Haddock, supra note 32.
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modest means value a different sort of amenity, perhaps parkland in or
near urban areas accessible by public transportation. A tax allowance for
an environmental easement would increase the amount of land devoted
to the former while seeming to have little impact on the latter.
Where the alternatives are mutually inconsistent, however, that
result becomes clouded. For example, a wooded area along a city's edge
could be a quiet wildlife refuge funded by a generous donor living
nearby so that deer, owls, and the occasional fox can be glimpsed from a
few well-groomed horse trails, a setting that functionally excludes the
poor. Neighboring back yards bordering the refuge would be more
attractive as a result. The compensating increase in real estate prices
would mean that nearby homebuyers would tend to become even
wealthier.
Alternatively, a much denser network of trails, some paved for
bicycles, could interconnect a number of multi-unit picnic areas with ball
fields nearby. Those in neighboring backyards would hear more noise
and see less wildlife. The denser network would sacrifice nearby
residents' external benefits for those of a more distant and perhaps less
affluent population. The second plan would therefore be less likely to
attract the donor's investment. Both amenities convey benefits, but both
also impose costs, one of them arising from the contraction of one
amenity necessary to expand the other.
The question to be considered, therefore, is not merely whether
environmental amenities are to be supported by government policy, but
which environmental entities are to be supported, since in this instance
the community cannot have both. If initially wildlife refuges and picnic
zones were properly divided according to some standard, the tax benefit
would unbalance the system toward wildlife refuges. That is not to argue
that a proper division had been achieved before the tax benefit was
instituted, but the prospect that a bluntly applied tax allowance will
redress an imbalance seems about as likely as the prospect that the
imbalance will be exacerbated. And the error-induced losses increase
geometrically with the magnitude of the error.
One question, then, concerns whether the aggregate increase in
amenities arising from tax allowances is worth the resulting impact on
the progressivity of the tax structure plus the cost of distorting the
environmental investments made by the wealthy. The other question
concerns whether less distortionary subsidies can be utilized instead.
3. Oversight-FreeBureaucracy

Providing tax write-offs in exchange for environmental
easements does not necessarily effectively substitute private for
bureaucratic decision making. Suppose Alice owns a plot next to
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Wonderland National Park. A bureaucrat in the National Park Service
(NPS) would like to add her plot to Wonderland and inserts a line item
in the NPS budget proposal submitted to Congress. Congress determines
that the addition would be worth $60,000 and budgets that amount for
acquisition. Alice values the plot by $70,000 and refuses to sell.
Comparison with other takings in the vicinity makes it seem likely that a
common law court will award Alice compensation of $100,000 if eminent
domain is used by the NPS to take the plot. Assuming a correct
congressional evaluation of the plot's value as a park addition, the plot
seems destined to remain in its higher valued non-park use despite being
coveted by the NPS bureaucracy.
Suppose, however, that if Alice sells the plot to a non-profit
environmental organization for less than full market value she will be
able to claim a tax write-off for the difference. She sells for $55,000 and
claims a write-off for $45,000. If Alice's marginal tax rate is one-third, the
write-off enables Alice to realize a $55,000 sales price plus a tax reduction
of $15,000, or $70,000. 49 The environmental organization then sells the
plot to the NPS for the budgeted $60,000, takes the funds (including the
organization's $5,000 profit) and repeats the process elsewhere. In
essence, taxpayers have paid for the property in two installments, once
as a $15,000 reduction in the treasury's tax receipts from Alice, then
again as a $60,000 payment from the treasury to the environmental
organization. That neither of those payments individually matches the
value of the plot as parkland hardly implies that the sum of the two must
be less than that value.
Though this hypothetical may seem farfetched, a few ostensibly
independent environmental organizations, arguing that they are more
skilled at acquiring than managing the land, seem indeed to function as
stalking horses for government bureaucracies in much this fashion. The
NPS augments its territory despite an implicit congressional
determination that the acquisition was inadvisable. So a program
trumpeted as a means to substitute private for bureaucrat decision
making can be corrupted, and in some instances apparently is being
corrupted, to shield bureaucracies from close congressional oversight.
Unfortunately, as one conference attendee piquantly put it, for a number
of decades the land management units of government have resembled
roach motels - land checks in, but it never checks out.50
49. The specific dollar figures used to make the example work would have to be
adjusted for whatever tax rate applies to Alice, but the point remains that realistic figures
can be found to establish the hypothetical.
50. Julia D. Mahoney, Address at PERC's annual political economy forum, Private
Land Conservation: Institutions and Instruments, Big Sky, Mont., Dec. 5-8, 2002.
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V. CONCLUSION
Environmentalists often point to the planet's limited resource
base and urge that resources must be conserved, and with good reason.
But we often do a rather poor job of thinking completely through the
implications of that postulate. At some point it becomes necessary to
stop scolding and actually come to grips with the planet's budget
constraints -it is impossible to conserve everything to the utmost, and it
would be undesirable even to try. Saving more of one good thing means
giving up some of another. Obsessively relishing what is to be saved
while ignoring or dismissing evidence of what will consequently be lost
is bound to leave everyone in a right pickle. Before affairs are
rearranged, wise people will ponder both sides of that inequality.
Certainly an appropriately motivated analysis would endeavor
to find and correct externalities-but only relevant ones. High
transaction cost and uncontrollable free riding do not lead inexorably to
resource misallocation, but ill-considered efforts to deal with them will.
When transaction cost is low, no free riding occurs, and voluntary
agreements appropriately arrange for environmental amenities. But the
converse does not follow. In any particular instance high transaction cost
and private inability to eliminate free riding may justify political
intrusion, but in each instance that determination will require substantial
further investigation.
If Jane purchases a book for 30 dollars when she would have
paid up to 40, economists say she has received a ten-dollar consumer
surplus-but we never characterize it as free riding on the publisher. If
Jane receives that book gratis because the publisher is freeing inventory
space, her surplus is 40 dollars. But if Dick receives for free or for only
ten dollars an environmental amenity when he would have paid as much
as 40 if pushed to the wall, many people want to claim that he is free
riding and call it market failure. That leap is too facile. Each market
embeds a public good. Some books are never published because too
small a portion of a substantial surplus can be captured to cover
overhead, but most manuscripts that languish would be unable to cover
overhead cost even if all surplus could be captured. Distinguishing the
two is very easy in an equation or diagram where no numbers need be
attached to the variables, but the same project becomes very difficult in
practice where the numbers are essential. Estimating those values would
become especially difficult if the treasury paid all publication costs so
there was no market to generate data. Happily, with both literature and
environmental amenities, overhead cost can often be covered privately
while consumers share a surplus. Without surplus it would hardly
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matter whether or not something could be produced, and why argue that
producers should have it all?
Still, the concern with free riders is overstated rather than
vacuous. Sometimes less of an amenity exists because the free riders are
numerous. But even then that cost must be contrasted with the cost of
employing non-market means to extract support. Governmental
resolutions gut the process of its information collecting ability, its ability
to control agency cost, its ability to mitigate the monopolistic aspects of
unitary government, its ability to avoid political favoritism, and its
ability to identify those who might have volunteered a contribution
without coercion. Geographically smaller regulatory units will often
have a comparative advantage in that regard over larger units. But even
then regulatory cost will sometimes exceed its benefit. The unattainable
ideal might be perfection, but the optimum may lie with a free-rider
induced amenity shortfall.
The problem with environmental amenities, then, is not always
that government policy is too lax. Sometimes government policy is quite
active but works against rather than for optimal amenity provision.
Recognizing that, many observers focus on reforming those government
policies, and it is hard to wish them ill. A better-informed and bettermotivated government could no doubt improve things right across the
board, not merely with regard to environmental amenities. Our focus
should be wide enough to recognize that government policy will never
be perfectly informed nor perfectly motivated, so imposing appropriate
constraints on government is sometimes more promising than trying to
redirect and reenergize (or de-energize) its policies.
At the end of the day, sufficient conditions are different from
necessary conditions. Low transaction cost is sufficient to justify leaving
decision making in private hands, but it is not necessary. As Terry
Anderson suggests, much mischief arises from a misperception that
transaction cost is high where it is not or that some enjoy a free ride
though they cannot.5' But surely a great deal of mischief also arises from
a misperception that high transaction cost and widespread, even
rampant, free riding justify a headlong charge up the Capitol steps. They
do not.
Quick and easy answers usually betray careless logic, enabling
embedded though hidden beneficiaries to confound the careless and
impatient, though the gains are less than the more poorly discerned
losses.5 2 Easy environmental answers cloak a Trojan amenity.
51. Anderson, supra note 27, at 377.
52. David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulationon Demand, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311
(1987).

